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against the grain of anti-trust legislation, the purpose of which is to
promote and protect competition. Whatever the reason it is certain
that the narrow application of Robinson-Patman remains and it is
clear that any extension of coverage beyond tangible personal property
and into the area of privileges, services, and interests in real property
will have to come from Congress.
MICHAEL E. LOWRY
AIR POLLUTION AS A PRIVATE NUISANCE
The problem of air pollution, though immediate in our minds,
has been recognized since 1306, when the burning of sea coal was
forbidden in England under the penalty of death.1 Monetary com-
pensation for damage from air pollution is recoverable under the
nebulous tort concept of private nuisance,2 on the theory that a right
in the use and enjoyment of land has been invaded.3
Wright v. Masonite Corp.4 involved a private nuisance action
for damages caused by noxious gases. The plaintiff owned a small
grocery store located approximately 2o0 feet from the defendant's
masonite board factory. One phase of the defendant's production
process involved spraying some of the boards with a lacquer or var-
nish containing a urea-formaldehyde resin.5 Fumes created during
this spraying process were emitted from the factory by two large
exhaust fans. Prior to December 1962 there was no odor of any con-
sequence in the vicinity of the plaintiff's grocery. Toward the end
of December, a noxious odor became apparent in and around the
grocery, and by January 1963 customers were complaining that the
"Kennedy & Porter, Air Pollution: Its Control and Abatement, 8 VAND. L. REV.
854 (955).
-Seavey, Nuisance: Contributory Negligence and Other Mysteries, 65 HARv. L.
REv. 984 (1952); PRossER, Tors § 87 (3d ed. 1964).
3Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp., 198 Misc. 291, 95 N.Y.S.2d 414, 422 (Sup.
Ct. 1956); Beckman v. Marshall, 85 So. 2d 552, 554 (Fla. 1956); RSTATEMENT OF
TORTS ch. 4o, at 217 (1939).
4S68 F.2d 661 (4 th Cir. 1966).
5A urea-formaldehyde resin is produced by combining urea and formaldehyde.
This combination is then mixed with other chemicals and compounds in various
quantities and proportions to produce what is known in the trade as a synthetic
lacquer or a synthetic varnish. In the manufacturing process, the urea and for-
maldehyde do not always result in a perfect combination of the two chemicals,
and the result in the finished product in such case is a very small percentage of
"free" formaldehyde. Appendix to petition for writ of certiorari, p. 6, Wright v.
Masonite Corp., 368 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1966).
CASE COMMENTS
groceries had a bad taste. At the end of January 1963, the odor
had premeated almost every item in the store, and early in February
the plaintiff was forced to close his business. During this time, state
health officials failed to locate the source of the odor, and it was not
until February 1963 that a professor of chemistry was able to de-
termine that the odor in and around the plaintiff's store was formalde-
hyde gas.
The plaintiff brought a diversity action for nuisance in the United
States District Court which resulted in a dismissal with prejudice.
This court found that the defendant company was the source of the
harm and damages were fixed at S12,ooo. However, the court also
found that the plaintiff had failed to prove a cause of action for
damages under the law of North Carolina because the invasion was
not intentional. 6 On appeal, the decision of the lower court was
affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
which held that for an invasion to be intentional the actor must act
"for the purpose of causing the harm or... [know] that it is resulting
or is substantially certain to result from his conduct."
7
A nuisance arising from the emission of noxious gases involves "a
more or less continuous interference with the use and enjoyment of
property by causing or permitting the escape of deleterious substances
or things such as smoke, odors.... etc."s Within this category two
distinct rules have been used by courts to determine whether the de-
fendant is liable for damages: (i) the Absolute Nuisance Rule and
(2) the Restatement of Torts Rule. The often cited Rylands v. Fletcher
case,0 a possible third rule, is in reality a form of the Absolute Nuisance
Rule,10 and its actual use in the field of air pollution has been limited,"
0368 F.2d 661, 665 (4 th Cir. 1966). The court relies chiefly on Morgan v. High
Penn Oil Co., 238 N.C. 185, 77 S.E.2d 682 (1953), as the basis for following the
Restatement view. This case deals with the erection of an oil refinery approximately
ioo feet from plaintiff's home and the emission of fumes into the air.
7368 F.2d at 663.
si HARPER & JAhms, ToRTs § 1.23, at 64 (1956).
BFletcher v. Rylands, 3 H. & C. 774, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (1865), reversed in
Fletcher v. Rylands [1866] L.R. i Ex. 265, affirmed in Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R.
3 H.L. 300 (1868). This famous English case deals with the flooding of plaintiff's
coal mine by the sudden release of water from a reservoir on the defendant's land.
The Court of Exchequer stated:
We think the true rule of law is that the person who for his own pur-
poses brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do
mischief if it escapes must keep it at his peril, and if he does not do so
is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural conse-
quence of its escape.
L. R. i Ex. 265, 279-80 (1866).
1 0Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEx. L. REV. 399, 426 (1942).
uThe following two cases have specifically relied on Rylands in the area of
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serving only to confuse further an already confused area of law.
The Absolute Nuisance Rule12 is an American version of strict
liability in the field of nuisance.
13
[A]bsolute nuisance may be defined as a distinct civil wrong,
arising or resulting from the invasion of a legally protected in-
terest, and consisting of an unreasonable interference with
the use and enjoyment of the property of another; the doing of
anything, or the permitting of anything under one's control
or direction to be done without just cause or excuse, the neces-
sary consequence of which interferes with or annoys another
in the enjoyment of his legal rights .... 34
The Absolute Nuisance Rule eliminates negligence 15 as a requirement
air pollution: Susquehanna Fertilizer Co. v. Malone, 73 Md. 268, 2o Atl. 9oo (189o);
Frost v. Berkeley Phosphate Co., 42 S.C. 402, 20 S.E. 280 (1894). A recent English
case applied the Rylands Rule and was commented on in CAMB. L.J. 168 (s96i).
The comment dealt with the case of Halsey v. Esso Petroleum Co. (ig61) i Weekly
L.R. 683 which applied Rylands v. Fletcher in granting recovery for damage to the
plaintiff's laundry hanging on the line and the paint on his car caused by the
emission of acidic fumes from the defendant's premises.
The following cases have used the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher but not in
the field of air pollution: Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Amicon Fruit Co., 269 Fed. 559
(4th Cir. 192o); Central Ind. Coal Co. v. Goodman, iii Ind. App. 480, 39 N.E.2d
484 (1942); fHelms v. Eastern Kansas Oil Co., 102 Kan. 164, 169 Pac. 20o8 (1917);
Bridgemann-Russell Co. v. City of Duluth, 158 Minn. 509, 197 N.W. 971 (1924);
Central Exploration Co. v. Gray, 219 Miss. 757, 70 So. 2d 33 (t954); Thigpen v.
Skousen & Hise, 64 N.M. 290, 327 P.2d 802 (1958); Bradford Glycerine Co. v. St.
Marys Woolen Mfg. Co., 6o Ohio St. 560, 54 N.E. 528 (1899); Brown v. Gessler,
191 Ore. 503, 230 P.2d 541 (1951); Weaver Mercantile Co. v. Thurmond, 68 W. Va.
530, 70 S.E. 126 (1911).
The following cases have specifically rejected the doctrine of Rylands v.
Fletcher: Fritz v. E.I. Dupont DeNemours & Go., 45 Del. 427, 75 A.2d 256 (195o)
(air pollution); United Fuel Gas Co. v. Sawyers, 259 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1953); Reynolds
v. W. H. Hinman Co., 145 Me. 343, 75 A.2d 802 (195o); Kelley v. National Lead
Co., 210 S.W.2d 728 (Mo. 1948) (air pollution); DeGray v. Murray, 69 N.J.L. 458,
55 At. 237 (1903); Sinclair Prairie Oil Co. v. Stell, 19o Okla. 344, 124 P.2d 255
(1942); Waschak v. Moffat, 379 Pa. 441, 1o9 A.2d 310 (1954) (air pollution); Rose
v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 54 R.I. 411, 173 At. 627 (1934); Turner v. Big Lake Oil
Co., 128 Tex. 155, 96 S.W.2d 221 (1936); Jacoby v. Town of City of Gillette, 62
Wyo. 487, 174 P.2d 505 (1946). See Pollock, Duties of Insuring Safety, 2 L.Q. REV.
52, 55 (1886).
"King v. Columbian Carbon Co., 152 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1945); United Verde
Extension Mining Co. v. Ralston, 37 Ariz. 554, 296 Pac. 262 (1931); Boston Ferrule
Co. v. Hills, 159 Mass. 147, 34 N.E. 85 (1893); Bohan v. Port Jervis Gas-Light Co.,
122 N.Y. 18, 25 N.E. 246 (189o); Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co. v. Barnes,
6o S.W. 593 (Tenn. 19oo); G. L. Webster Co. v. Steelman, 172 Va. 342, 1 S.E.2d 305
(1939); Bartel v. Ridgefield Lumber Co., 131 Wash. 183, 229 Pac. 3o6 (1924).
nKeeton, Trespass, Nuisance, and Strict Liability, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 457-58
(1959).
"'Taylor v. City of Cincinnati, 143 Ohio St. 426, 55 N.E.2d 724, 730 (1944). This
rule is also followed in Beckwith v. Town of Stratford, 129 Conn. 506, 29 A.2d 775,
777 (1942).
5G. L. Webster Co. v. Steelman, 172 Va. 342, 1 S.E.2d 305, 311 (1939); McFarlane
v. City of Niagara Falls, 247 N.Y. 340, i6o N.E. 391 (1928).
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for imposing liability. United Verde Extension Mining Co. v. Ral-
ston'( applied this rule. Here the court said that the operation of a
smelter, in itself lawful, became a nuisance if it discharged poisonous
gas and smoke which was carried by wind currents onto and caused
injury to the land of another. The location of the smelter, sixteen
miles from the plaintiff's premises, was deemed immaterial 17 in de-
termining liability.
The rule looks to the defendant's intention to bring about certain
conditions which are in fact found to be a nuisance,18 without regard
to whether his actions were reasonable' 9 or the invasion itself
intended. For example, emitting gas into the atmosphere indicates
an intention to create such a condition.
The rule of absolute nuisance should not be confused with a
nuisance per se, which is a nuisance at all times and under any cir-
cumstances, regardless of location or surroundings. 20 It is generally
agreed that a lawful business can never be a nuisance per se.2' Under
the absolute rule, the existence of a nuisance, actionable in damages,
does not necessarily give rise to injunctive relief, since the need for
the activity may outweigh the damage produced and injunctive relief
becomes another question.22
It has been suggested that certain property rights have been given
greater protection from interference than other rights and that non-
polluted air may fall into that category.23
137 Ariz. 554, 296 Pac. 262, 264-65 (1931).
1737 Ariz. 554, 296 Pac. 262, 265 (1931). See also Bartel v. Ridgefield Lumber Co.,
131 Wash. 183, 229 Pac. 306, 308 (1924). Here the court notes the material harm done
and disregards the locality of the business and the methods used.
"Beckwith v. Town of Stratford, 129 Conn. 5o6, 29 A.2d 775 (1942); Seavey,
Nuisance: Contributory Negligence and Other Mysteries, 65 HARv. L. REV. 984,
992 (1952); Wright v. Masonite Corp., 368 F.2d 661, 666 (4th Cir. 1966). (A. Bryan,
J. dissenting). The dissent makes this point by giving the RESTATEMENT view of
"intention" a broader interpretation than the majority of the court does. "It is not
whether the injury was intentional; but whether the causative acts were inten-
tionally done."
"'Courts attempting to determine the reasonableness of the defendant's actions
look at locality, nature of the trade, manner of using property, extent of the injury,
and the effect on life, health and property. Fox v. Ewers, 195 Md. 650, 75 A.2d
357 (1950); Reber v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 161 Miss. 885, 138 So. 574 (1932).
21Ozark Bi-Products v. Bohannon, 224 Ark. 17, 271 S.V.2d 354, 356 (1954).
21Judson v. Los Angeles Suburban Gas Co., 157 Cal. 168, io6 Pac. 581, 583
(191o); McPherson v. First Presbyterian Church, 120 Okla. 40, 248 Pac. 561, 565
(1926); Town of Colton v. South Dakota Cent. Land Co., 25 S.D. 3o9, 126 N.W.
507, 509 (1910).2!Anderson v. American Smelting & Ref. Co., 265 Fed. 928 (D.C. Utah 1919);
Poultryland, Inc. v. Anderson, 200 Ga. 549, 37 S.E.2d 785 (1946).
"Patterson v. Peabody Coal Co., 3 Ill. App. 2d 311, 122 N.E.2d 48, 51 (1954);
Union Cemetery Co. v. Harrison, 2o Ala. App. 291, 101 So. 517, 519 (1924); PRossFa,
Toxrs § 88, at 603 (3 d ed. 1964).
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The second approach, as set out in the Restatement of Torts,
2 4
is an attempt to classify the various forms of liability that constitute
actionable nuisance.
The actor is liable in an action for damages for a non-
trespassory25 invasion of another's interest in the private use
and enjoyment of land if,
(a) the other has property rights and privileges in respect to
the use or enjoyment interfered with; and
(b) the invasion is substantial; and
(c) the actor's conduct is a legal cause of the invasion; and
(d) the invasion is either
(i) intentional and unreasonable; or
(ii) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the
rules governing liability for negligent, reckless or
ultrahazardous conduct. 26
The Restatement definition of an intentional invasion requires
that the defendant either specifically act for the purpose of causing
the invasion or be substantially certain that the invasion will result
from his actions.27 Waschak v. Moffat 2s illustrates the Restatement
24The following cases which adopt the REsrATEMENT view deal with the emission
of noxious gases and odors: E. Rauh & Sons Fertilizer Co. v. Shreffier, 139 F.2d 38
(6th Cir. 1943); Chapman Chem. Co. v. Taylor, 215 Ark. 630, 222 S.W.2d 82o
(1949); Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 19o P.2d 1 (1948); Koseris v. J. R.
Simplot Co., 82 Idaho 263, 352 P.2d 235 (196o); Patterson v. Peabody Coal Co.,
3 Ill. App. 2d 311, 122 iN.E.2d 48 (1954); Riter v. Keokuk Electro-Metals Co., 248
Iowa 710, 82 N.W.2d 151 (1957); Fuchs v. Curran Carbonizing & Eng'r Co., 279
S.W.2d 211 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955); McKenna v. Allied Chem. & Dye Corp., 8 App.
Div. 2d 463, 188 N.Y.S.2d 919 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Mor gan v. High Penn Oil Co., 238
N.C. 185, 77 S.E.2d 682 (1953); Soukoup v. Republic Steel Corp., 78 Ohio App.
87, 66 N.E.2d 334 (1946). Courts have adopted this rule hoping to "obviate the
difficulty and confusion in attempting to reconcile or distinguish the great mass
of cases." Waschak v. Moffat, 379 Pa. 441, iog A.2d 31o, 314 (1954).
nTrespass is an invasion of the plaintiff's interest in exclusive possession of
land, while nuisance is an interference with one's use and enjoyment of it. RESrATE-
MENT or TORTS ch. 40, at 224 (1939). But see, Note, 39 TEx. L. REv. 243 (ig6o)
which discusses and criticizes a case dealing with the election of remedy of trespass
or nuisance for emission of flouride gas.
R.SATFMENT OF TORTS § 822 (1939).
-"RESTATEMENIT OF ToRTs § 825 (1939) says: "An invasion of another's interest in
the use and enjoyment of land is intentional when the actor (a) acts for the purpose
of causing it; or (b) knows that it is resulting or is substantially certain to result
from his conduct." Comment (a) says: "It is not enough to make an invasion inten-
tional that the actor realizes or should realize that his conduct involves a serious
risk or likelihood of causing such an invasion. He must either act for the purpose
of causing it or know that it is resulting or is substantially certain to result from
his conduct." Id. at 238.
2'379 Pa. 441, 1o9 A.2d 310 (1954).
